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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at linking cross border mobility of students and graduates with the financing of 
higher education. Against the background of institutional features and empirical evidence of the 
European Union and Northern America, a theoretical framework is developed. This allows analyzing 
the optimal financing regimes for different migration scenarios, comparing them with the regimes in 
place and discussing possible remedies. In particular, the (optimal) sharing of education costs 
between students / graduates and tax-payers is studied as well as the (optimal) sharing of the tax-
payers’ part between the various countries involved: the country which provides higher education 
(the host country), the country of previous education (the origin country) and possibly the countries 
which benefit from the improved skills of the workers. Alternative designs exhibiting potentially 
desirable properties are developed and policy recommendations derived.  
Key words: Mobility of students; Mobility of graduates; Financing of higher education 
JEL: F22, H52, I23. 
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1. Introduction and background 
Globalization and student and graduate mobility have important consequences for fiscal policy. The 
scope to generate public revenues becomes more limited while the need for public expenditure does 
not necessarily decrease (see in particular Wildasin, 2014). In this paper, we focus on the 
consequences of international mobility of students and graduates for one specific aspect of fiscal 
policy, the financing of higher education. 
The point of view adopted might be regarded as typically European. The European features 
highlighted, however, simply reinforce the more general argument developed below. Those features 
are the following: First, in the European Union (EU) mobility of students and graduates is not only a 
fact that we have to live with, but it is also something desirable for the building of the EU. Second, 
and for that latter reason, two key instruments to favor mobility of students have been set up and 
deserve further examination. Finally the EU legislative framework introduces legal constraints as to 
the education policy in EU member states. 
Let us provide some details about those three features which are relevant for understanding the 
European higher education system and related issues, especially those which differ from the United 
States (US). 
1.1. Politically desirable mobility 
Sharing a common set of values, a common culture and a common lingua franca, being related to 
each other through cross border networks, and visiting each other beyond the barriers of 
psychological, linguistic and historical distances, are all powerful instruments for turning a set of 
separated people and territories into a unified entity of peace, efficiency and fairness. This is true for 
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.  
However, in the US, that process was facilitated by the fact that, say, people of Irish and Italian 
descent settled in the same cities on the East coast and moved to the West coast progressively, but 
together. This is different in Europe where Italian and Irish people are linked to different territories 
separated by seas and some fifteen hundred kilometers; and they have nearly no common history. 
Moreover, while the goal of the founders of the US was the creation of a country, today’s objective 
of the EU is definitely much less ambitious: creating a union, a poorly defined concept, the upper 
bound of which is a true country and the lower bound an efficient and fair single market. Let us 
adopt that latter option, though it is just a minimal position. As a consequence we assume that the 
goal of EU leaders is to build a single market for highly qualified EU-wide mobile workers and that 
mobility of students deserves EU incentives because it feeds further mobility of graduates and 
3 
 
workers with researchers as a particular segment among the highly skilled people. Mobility of labor, 
and thus a single market for labor, facilitates the functioning of a monetary union.2 However, 
compared with the US, the EU experiences a lack of mobility of its workforce. As pointed out by the 
EU commission, “People in the US are much more likely to move to a different US state than people 
in the EU are to move to another EU region. In the EU, those of working age who changed their 
region of residence in 2008 amounted to only 1.2% of total working age population as against 2.8% in 
the US.” (European Commission, 2010, p.11). 
Another objective of the EU is to make that area the most advanced one in research, development 
and innovation – see the Lisbon Agenda (European Council, 2000), the Sapir Report (Sapir et al., 
2003) and more recently the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission, 2010a), especially the 
flagship program “Youth on the move”. That objective can serve as a justification for the European 
Commission to stimulate the mobility of researchers. 
1.2. Two instruments to support mobility within the EU 
It is impossible to deal with the mobility of students in Europe without mentioning the two main 
instruments which were launched and/or supported by the EU Commission to foster that mobility: 
the Erasmus program on the one hand and the Bologna process on the other hand.  
1.2.1. Erasmus students 
The Erasmus Program, launched in 1987, is probably the best known instrument to facilitate 
students’ mobility within the EU (and a series of partner countries). Over 25 years, the program has 
enabled more than 2,300,000 students to spend at least one semester studying at the tertiary level in 
a country different from the one where they will receive their degree. For example, a German or an 
Austrian student enrolled in an Austrian university with the aim of obtaining a degree from that 
university might spend a term or a year as an Erasmus student at a Polish university. 
This program is an exchange program. The student enrolls in the university which will grant the 
degree, pays her tuition fee to that university and visits, at no additional tuition cost, the other 
country’s university where she will receive credits for courses and exams to be recognized in her own 
university curriculum. There is no transfer of money between the universities or countries in that 
process. However, a double agreement lies at the basis. The first agreement is between the 
universities to set up the general framework of the exchange. The second one is between the 
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student and her own country’s university which has to approve the content of the curriculum that 
she will follow abroad. For the stay abroad, the students may receive a grant from their own 
university, financed by the EU, to cover the cost of living abroad. 
Though extremely successful, this program is unbalanced. For the academic year 2010-2011, Spain 
sent about 31,500 students abroad3, which represents 2% of that country’s student population, and 
received nearly 30,600 foreign students in the framework of the Erasmus program. In contrast, the 
United Kingdom (UK) sent only around 8,600 students abroad, a figure which is about half a per cent 
of the UK student population, and received 17,500 foreign students in the framework of the 
program. Even though the numbers of outgoing and incoming UK students are much smaller 
(relatively and absolutely) than for Spain, the UK’s in- and outflows are much more unbalanced as 
that country receives twice as many students as it sends abroad. 
Leaving aside the obvious attraction of the Spanish sun and ambience, there are at least two other 
reasons that explain this discrepancy. On the one hand, unlike other EU citizens, UK students are 
probably less motivated in going abroad: they have no need to learn another language since they 
speak the lingua franca of Europe and the world, and they also have access to the best European 
universities; as a consequence there is little room for exchange. On the other hand, UK universities, 
and especially universities located in England, have no interest in welcoming European students for 
free when they can easily attract non-EU students and charge them high tuition fees.  
That peculiarity of England is further examined by Murphy (2014), where he states that “the total 
number of overseas students in UK universities has increased by 91% from 2000/2001 to 2008/2009 
and by 170% since 1994/1995. The postgraduate sector has seen the highest growth in overseas 
students in terms of proportions and absolute numbers. There are now quintuple the number of 
overseas taught postgraduates than there were in 1995, increasing from 15,000 to 77,000. These 
overseas students are also typically paying higher tuition fees than domestic students, approximately 
£10k for non-laboratory subjects on average. Thus, overseas students are now a major source of 
income for the HE sector, currently contributing 8.6% of the total income of the sector.” 
Note that since England has made itself less attractive for European exchange students, and since 
learning English is one of the motivations for student exchange, non-UK universities have deliberately 
decided to propose substitute programs entirely taught in English, as is the case in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. 
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The fact that the EU budget – which is small compared to the US Federal one – amounting to around 
one percent of EU – wide GDP, finances Erasmus fellowships to foster mobility of students, and to a 
smaller extent, of professors and clerical staff, illustrates the differences in the advancement of the 
integration process between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean. There is no such federal program in 
the USA. For an observer from the EU, putting together students from different US states no longer 
seems to be a policy goal since the process has become natural in a geographically integrated nation; 
though possibly putting together students from different socio-economic backgrounds or ethnic 
origins is the true challenge for the US. In contrast, in Europe, the challenge is still to mix students 
from different nations and, thus, to set up a peaceful entity through, among other things, a single 
labor market for skilled people. 
1.2.2. Bologna students 
Unlike in the Erasmus program, within the Bologna framework, a student enrolls in the school where 
she actually attends classes for a term or a year or more, pays the tuition fee for that institution and 
is permitted to have the credits obtained abroad – the so-called ECTS (European Credit Transfer 
System) – recognized in the program that she follows in her original country.4 
The Bologna Process was not an initiative of the EU itself when launched in 1999; its initial goal was 
to build up a European educational space by 2010. Although it was signed in the Italian city of 
Bologna by the Ministers in charge of higher education in 46 European countries, this process does 
not rest on an intergovernmental arrangement. Its philosophy is well summarized in the Bologna’s 
Declaration (Bologna Declaration, 1999). That declaration states that “A Europe of Knowledge is now 
widely recognized as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth and as an indispensable 
component to consolidate and enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the 
necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an awareness of 
shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space”. 
It further recognizes the “Importance of education and educational cooperation in the development 
and strengthening of stable, peaceful and democratic societies” and the “Universities’ central role in 
developing European cultural dimensions”; and calls for the “creation of the European area of higher 
education as a key way to promote citizens’ mobility and employability and the Continent’s overall 
development”. In line with this philosophy six main goals were to be implemented, (1) adoption of a 
system of easily readable and comparable degrees in order to promote European citizens 
employability and the international competitiveness of the European higher education system; (2) 
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adoption of a system essentially based on two main cycles – undergraduate studies leading to a 
bachelor degree and graduate studies leading to a master degree; (3) establishment of a system of 
credits as a proper means of promoting the most widespread student mobility; (4) promotion of 
mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free movement; (5) promotion of 
European co-operation in quality assurance; and (6) promotion of the necessary European 
dimensions in higher education. 
The promotion of those six main goals might seem obvious to a US reader, again since the 
organization of higher education has become homogenous across the whole nation over time and 
without central government intervention or agreements between states.5 The Bologna goals have 
been turned into action lines, work plans and objectives which have evolved with time, as well as 
into legislative acts. We present evidence related to Bologna students’ movements and the ensuing 
imbalances in Section 2.3 below. 
1.3. EU principles of non-discrimination and subsidiarity 
In most EU countries, with the noticeable exception of England, higher education tuition fees are 
low, if not zero, for domestic and EU students.6 Moreover, two principles at the roots of the EU 
construction are at work. On the one hand, EU principles forbid a member state to discriminate 
against citizens of another member state.7 This implies that a Spanish university has to charge the 
same fee to non-Spanish EU residents as to Spanish ones. In contrast, though a university located in 
Scotland needs to accept a Belgian applicant under the same conditions as a Scottish one, including 
the tuition fees, the Scottish university may discriminate against English students because they come 
from the same EU member state, namely the UK. In other words, a situation where the University of 
California charges a higher tuition fee to students from Nevada than from California could not occur 
in the EU: it would be against EU law provided we compare the US and the EU and consider Nevada 
and California as different member states of the US.8 
Note that recently Belgium and Austria have departed from the non-discrimination principle, 
imposing quotas on foreign students in medical and paramedical studies on the basis that the 
number of applicants from abroad, expected to return home after completion of their studies, was a 
threat for the future of public health in those two countries. The European Court of Justice permitted 
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the use of such quotas provided the governments prove that such measures are necessary for the 
protection of public health in the future and that they are proportionated (European Court of Justice, 
2010).  
On the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity (Pelkmans, 2005) permits to transfer a competence 
from the level of the member states to that of the EU if and only if that competence might be better 
performed at that upper level. Education raises questions in that respect. If the education system is 
considered globally, from nursing school to university, there are serious arguments for keeping 
education a national – e.g., in France – or a sub-national – e.g., in Belgium, Germany or the UK –  
competence. If one focuses on tertiary education, the case is less clear, as will be elaborated on in 
the remainder of this paper. But all in all, the opinion of the majority of EU citizens is still to keep that 
competence at the national or sub-national level. In such a context a challenge for economists and 
designers of higher education systems is to portray a decentralized system which exhibits the same 
properties as a centralized one. 
Note that (largely) publicly funded higher education does not mean that university studies are free 
goods. Indeed, graduates are expected to earn higher wages than less skilled people and, therefore, 
to pay higher taxes, especially in those countries where labor income tax is progressive. In that sense, 
students receive implicit loans from the government during the time of their studies that they later 
repay, possibly with interest, contingent upon the income generated with skills acquired through 
their studies. One could conclude from that reasoning that the current system of financing higher 
education is close to a contingent loan mechanism9, namely, a system where the students receive 
money covering the cost of studies and sometimes the cost of living, and pay back that amount after 
their graduation, in line with their income.  
That reasoning holds in a world where the graduates pay their tax in the country where they 
graduated, and on which they have imposed a sacrifice in terms of GDP – the opportunity cost of 
studies. This is what we name later in this paper the old paradigm. However, it no longer holds in a 
setting where people coming from a first jurisdiction (their jurisdiction of origin), graduate in a 
second jurisdiction (their jurisdiction of studies), and then spend their career in one or several other 
ones (their jurisdiction of work). This is the new paradigm. In such a setting, the first two countries 
have contributed to the cost of studies and the other ones benefit from the skill of the graduate, as 
well as from the contribution to the local GDP and tax revenue, if no correction mechanism is 
introduced. 
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In today’s European Union we are in some sense moving from the first to the second setting, or from 
the old to the new paradigm, even if the first one still clearly dominates. However, the second setting 
may no longer be ignored; on the one hand, it corresponds to an emerging single market for high – 
skill labor, and on the other hand, it creates spillover effects or externalities which call for 
internalization if one wants to improve the efficiency of the higher education system in Europe. 
However, the issue related to those spillover effects is only of importance if mobility is unbalanced. 
This will be further elaborated on in the next section.  
The implications of the above mentioned spillover effects are addressed here from two perspectives. 
Our research question can be stated as “who is to pay for mobile students?” By “who” we mean, on 
the one hand, which jurisdiction – the country of origin (also called the “origin country”), that of 
studies (also called the “host country” since it hosts the students during her studies) or that of work 
(the “destination country”). On the other hand, we are interested in who in each jurisdiction 
contributes to the financing, i.e., the individual (the student or the graduate) or the local society. 
That latter distinction raises the question of social costs and benefits versus private ones.  
Let us add that, although in higher education the competencies are basically limited to the issue of 
norms, the EU Commission has real competencies in research with financial means and important 
framework projects. Especially, the European Research Council (ERC) plays a role quite similar to that 
of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States, though in the EU, each country also 
has its own research foundation, such as the CNRS in France and the DFG in Germany (see Gérard, 
Gilson and Ruiz, 2012). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set forth evidence of mobility of 
students and graduates, referring to the literature and current research: first that mobility of labor 
increases with the skill level of the worker; second that the mobility of graduates is incentivized by 
the mobility before and during tertiary education; and finally that the mobility for the purposes of 
study is unbalanced. That imbalance, however, is not homogeneous, at least in Europe. In Section 3, 
we address a first issue related to the imbalance of the mobility of students: the distribution of 
(social) benefits and costs of higher education between the society as a whole and the students, or 
their families, or later the graduates. Finally in Section 4, we focus on the move from the old to the 
new paradigm and investigate how a decentralized design of higher education financing may 
replicate an outcome generated centrally, i.e., designed at the level of the mobility area. A short 
conclusion follows in Section 5. 
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2. Mobility of students and graduates: challenge for (public) financing? 
In this section we provide evidence on the mobility of students and graduates, referring to the 
literature and new pieces of research. 
2.1. Mobility of labor increases with the skill of the workers 
That mobility increases with the skill level is well established, going back to Sjaastad (1962) - see also 
Borjas (1987, 1991), Ehrenberg and Smith (1994), and Uebelmesser (2006).10 Here we highlight it 
using Canadian data collected on the occasions of the 2001 and 2006 censuses.11 The interest in 
using Canadian data for this illustrative computation resides in their homogeneity: we have 
comparable figures for a series of jurisdictions belonging to the same union or federation.12 
If we consider the entire Canadian population, we observe that the fraction of the population living 
in one province in 2001, but in another province in 2006 amounts to 2.7% of the whole Canadian 
2001 population. But if we compute similar statistics for the holders of a bachelor degree, the 
fraction goes up to 4.4% and similarly for holders of a master degree while the figure is even slightly 
higher for Ph.D. holders. If we include in the computation people who were not living in Canada in 
2001 but migrated to that country between 2001 and 2006, the figures, respectively, are 6.4% for the 
entire population, 12.4% for holders of a bachelor degree, 17.4% for holders of a master degree and 
18.2% for Ph.D. holders. 
Though this evidence justifies the frequently issued hypothesis that high-skill workers are more 
mobile than low-skill workers (see Wildasin, 2014) , it also deserves at least two caveats: some high-
skill people, such as doctors who spend many years acquiring a set of patients, or auditors bound to 
residence by their customer base, can face a very high cost of migration; and conversely many low-
skill people can face a rather low migration cost when economic conditions are especially bad in their 
origin country, increasing therefore the expected gain from migration.  
In line with the notion that mobility increases with skill level, Gagliardi (2014) sets forth the role of 
highly skilled immigrants in the economic development of UK areas. 
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Backman and Bjerke (2010) study mobility of individuals with different educational backgrounds for Sweden 
and Waldorf (2011) looks at related issues for the US. See also some of the contributions in Poot, Waldorf and 
van Wissen (2009) and Varga (2009). 
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2.2. Mobility of graduates is incentivized by mobility before and during tertiary education  
The second observation, that graduate mobility can be positively linked to mobility before and during 
the studies, is well supported by the analysis of Felbermayr and Reczkowski (2014). Van Bouwel and 
Veugelers (2014) complement this by studying the migration pattern of Europeans who received 
their PhD from a US university. Around 70% decide to stay in the US for their first job and that stay 
rate is a good predictor of the location of those researchers ten years later. This is also confirmed by, 
e.g., Di Pietro (2012), Dreher and Poutvaara (2011), King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003), Oosterbeek and 
Webbink (2011), Parey and Waldinger (2011) and Voin and Gérard (2013). 
In particular, Voin and Gérard (2013) conducted a questionnaire survey on the alumni of a series of 
Belgian French-speaking universities. They ended up with more than 500 respondents, including 
mainly graduates from economic departments and business schools, providing them with data about 
the graduates themselves, their personal history and their family profile excluding personal and 
parents’ income. The analyses aimed at answering the following two questions: First, “what drives 
the expatriation of graduates?” in particular, “have stays abroad during tertiary education influenced 
careers abroad?” i.e., “is mobility of graduates driven by mobility during tertiary education?” and 
second, “what determines students’ mobility?” The answer to the first question is especially 
important in justifying the spending of European public money. Results were obtained through a 
probit model with average marginal effects (AME) calculated.  
Among the plausible determinants of graduates’ expatriation, two emerged as statistically significant: 
studies abroad without Erasmus support, and participation in the Erasmus program. There is, thus, 
evidence of the contribution of studies abroad, and especially of the Erasmus program, to the 
mobility of graduates and the construction of the single EU-wide market for high skill workers. 
Obviously, however, this doesnot mean that the Erasmus program is causal tograduates’ mobility; 
but at least it has accompanied and facilitated that mobility. 
Regarding the second question on determinants of students’ mobility, the level of education of the 
mother dominates the other determinants.This is not a surprise knowing that many studies in 
education economics report that the education of the mother is the first driver of education of the 
children. Itis, however, surprising, at first glance, to find the same also with respect to the mobility of 
the students. Education of the father is significant as well. Taken together, those variables also are a 
proxy for family income. One can argue that the Erasmus program is not a redistributive one, 
facilitating studies abroad especially by those who are most favored by their family environment. 
But experience abroad prior to entering university is also significant, either as such, or further 
specified as stays abroad for the purpose of learning a foreign language or to repeat the last year of 
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secondary education.13 Those students are already “internationally minded” when entering at 
university and it is no surprise that they are more likely to study abroad. In contrast, living abroad at 
the time of childhood is not significant. 
To sum up, one is more likely to expatriate if onehas stayed abroad during one’s university studies, 
has some experience abroad between secondary and tertiary education, and is an economist or 
management scientist by which it is meant that one has a degree in a field whose expertise is least 
country-specific. 
Let us add that among the many contributions devoted to students’ mobility,14 the work of Parey and 
Waldinger (2011) seems to be especially in line with the findings above. Their first conclusion is that 
additional subsidies involve larger student mobility and increasing professional mobility. Then, using 
a large database of German students, they investigate the causality between student mobility and 
professional mobility; they show that studying abroad increases the probability of working abroad by 
about 15-20%. Moreover, it seems that students tend to migrate to the countries where they resided 
during their studies. 
2.3. Mobility is unbalanced 
Although it is an increasing phenomenon, the mobility of students is unbalanced, as illustrated in 
Table 1. The figures reported document the fraction of students coming from abroad.The balance of 
mobility is obtained by taking the number of outgoing students minus the number of incoming 
students, divided by the total number of students. The number of outgoing students does not include 
the Erasmus students, but only those who enroll in a foreign university. Incoming students taken into 
account are those coming from other member states of the EU, also excluding Erasmus students. A 
negative sign means that the country is a net importer of young people – or raw human capital – and 
a net exporter of graduates – or enriched human capital since in today’s non-Anglo-Saxon Europe 
most intra - EU migrant students return home after their studies. Another interpretation of that 
negative sign is that those countriesare net exporters of higher education services. 
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Table 1 – Unbalanced mobility of students, European Union 
Countries 
Foreign 
students 
(%) 
Balance 
of 
mobility 
(%) 
Countries 
Foreign 
students 
(%) 
Balance 
of 
mobility 
(%) 
Austria 11.36 -8.02 Hungary 1.20 0.36 
Belgium 6.98 -4.62 Italy 0.54 1.06 
United Kingdom 4.06 -3.63 Finland 0.74 1.37 
Czech Rep. 5.21 -3.01 Poland 0.11 1.43 
Netherlands 4.17 -2.41 Portugal 0.68 2.50 
Denmark 2.70 -1.18 Greece 0.15 4.06 
Sweden 2.03 0.11 Ireland 1.92 7.47 
Germany 2.61 0.26 Slovak Rep. 1.59 9.73 
Spain 0.75 0.30 Luxembourg 37.00 232.70 
France 1.60 0.33    
Source: Gérard (2012) based on Eurostat and own calculation. 
 
When examining those negatively signed countries, three groups need to be distinguished. The first 
one consists of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands; the second one consists of 
the United Kingdom alone, and the last one of includes only Denmark. 
The members of the first group have in common large neighboring countries – France for Belgium, 
Germany for the other countries – which are quite selective regarding admissions to medical and 
paramedical studies. Then, students who fail at the entrance examination level in their own country, 
either France or Germany, enroll in the equivalent programs of their small neighboring countries 
where language is the same or similar, access to studies is formally easier – no entrance examination, 
and tuition fees are generally low – they are nil in Austria and in the Czech Republic (in the Czech 
Republic, a 1,000 euro per term extra fee is charged to students following courses taught in another 
language than Czech), they amount to 830 euro per year in Belgium and up to about 2,500 euro in 
the Netherlands.15 And as a consequence of the EU laws the nationality of the degree does not 
preclude practice in another country. Therefore, one may conclude that France and Germany free-
ride on their small attractive neighbors; and that the foreign students attracted by those small 
countries are not the best students in their field and cohort.  
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, according to Felbermayr and Reczkowski (2014), the 
retention rate in countries like Austria or Belgium does not reach 5%. Using the terminology of the 
previous section, France - to take that case - is both the country of origin of the students and that of 
work once they have graduated, supporting the opportunity cost and getting all the benefits, while 
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 See http://www.studyineurope.eu/tuition-fees. 
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Belgium, the host country during the studies, bears the cost of the studies of those foreign students. 
That reality reduces Belgium’s enthusiasm to welcome EU students, a reason why that country – and 
Austria also – introduced quota in some fields of studies, which is per se inefficient. 
The second group comprises the UK alone. In that country, the language is country-specific but used 
in the entire world as lingua franca, access to studies is intellectually demanding – admission is very 
selective and based on documented files, and tuition fees are very high by European standards – up 
to £9,000 a year for residents of England and of the EU (Murphy, 2014). Moreover, again according 
to Felbermayr and Reczkowski (2014), the retention rate amounts to more than 35%. And using again 
the terminology of the previous section, the cost of the studies is supported by the country of origin 
while a larger part of  benefits go to the host country during the studies, which is also that of work 
for 35% of the graduates. Here the externality benefits UK. 
Finally the case of Denmark, another singleton, deserves particular interest. Its attractiveness as a 
place to work is probably limited, as for other non-Anglo-Saxon countries. However, Denmark 
welcomes many students from Nordic countries. These countries partially compensate Denmark for 
the provision of higher education. We come back to that mechanism in Section 4 of this contribution. 
We can conclude from the stylized facts presented in this sub-section that, among skilled people, 
studies abroad and thus, mobility during higher education, is an important driver of expatriation and 
thus of mobility during their career. The former mobility, in turn, is incentivized by an international 
experience between secondary and tertiary education as well as by the level of education of the 
parents, especially of the mother. Nevertheless, the cross border flows of students are unbalanced. 
Therefore in a decentralized world like the EU, where higher education is extensively financed by the 
government of the jurisdictions which host the students, and tuition fees must not discriminate 
between EU residents on the basis of their country of origin, unbalanced transfers, and thus 
externalities, undermine the efficient functioning of that otherwise appealing system called the 
Bologna process.  
This is per se an argument to allocate the responsibility of higher education to the level of the EU, 
something which is already the case when it comes to the definition of cursus norms but which 
seems to be impossible for the financing. One can say that the challenge is to find a decentralized 
system of financing tertiary education such that its outcome is as close as possible to that of a 
centralized one. That will be precisely the topic of Section 4. Note that the problem is different for 
research where some funding has been already set at the level of the EU and complements funding 
by national and sub-national authorities. 
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Imbalance in student migration is not a characteristic of the EU alone. If we look at US figures we 
may notice that 90%, 68% and 59% of freshman university students in Washington DC, Vermont and 
Rhode Island, respectively, are from out of state, while those figures amount to 9%, 11% and 12%for 
Michigan, California and Alaska, respectively.16 However, the first group consists of very small 
jurisidctions whose universities might be oversized with respect to the resident population so that 
interpretation of these figures is difficult. 
Also, we may replicate Table 1 for interprovincial students’ migration in Canada – see Table 2. Nova 
Scotia is historically a net exporter of university services (an importer of students) due to the large 
number of undergraduate-oriented student-friendly campuses. English speaking universities attract 
numerous Canadians and foreigners to the attractive city of Montreal; and the University of Prince 
Edward Island offers a limited range of programs so that many students have to study in other 
provinces. 
 
Table 2 – Interprovincial migration for higher education purposes in Canada 
Provinces 
Out of 
Province 
students 
(%) 
Balance 
of 
mobility 
(%) 
Provinces 
Out of 
Province 
students 
(%) 
Balance 
of 
mobility 
(%) 
Nova Scotia 29.3 -17.2 Manitoba 4.3 2.7 
Quebec 7.8 -4.1 Saskatchewan 4.6 4.1 
N-Brunswick 23.0 -1.9 Newfoundland 8.2 8.1 
Alberta 7.7 0.4 British. Co. 3.4 11.3 
Ontario 5.0 0.5 Prince Edward 18.7 31.4 
Source: Own calculation based on Junor and Usher (2008) using data from the 
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada for the year 2003-2004. Those 
authors notice that the number of students currently labeled as having home 
residence of “unknown” or “not applicable” is quite high. The problem is particularly 
noticeable in the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, where the University of 
Alberta and Simon Fraser University report significant segments of data under these 
categories in 2003-2004. 
 
3. How should the costs of education be shared between the individual and the government? 
With unbalanced mobility, the financing system is thus very important. In this section and the 
following one, we will discuss the question of which party should contribute to the financing of 
higher education. Is there a convincing argument for pure tax-financing by the government of the 
country who provides higher education or, more precisely, by all tax-payers no matter whether they 
                                                          
16
 See Junor and Usher (2008) based on data for the year 2003-2004 from the National Center for Education 
Statistics. 
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(or their children) have obtained a university education? Or should governments of other countries – 
and for that matter tax-payers – also contribute, notably governments of countries where the 
graduates then work? Or are there, on the contrary, reasons why higher education should be purely 
fee-financed, possibly with the support of contingent loans, by those who study? In this section, we 
focus on the distribution of the cost of studies between the student, through tuition fees, and the 
government, via the state budget. The question of the payment of that cost by the country of origin, 
by that of studies or by that of work after graduation, either through the public budget directly or via 
students or graduates, is left for Section 4. 
3.1 Some observations 
On average, private returns amount to 64% of total returns when the latter is measured by summing 
up private and public returns (see Table 3). We observe that private and public benefits from higher 
education are significant in all countries with private ones ranging from 82,000 euro in Denmark to 
320,000 euro in Portugal and public ones from being as low as 26,000 euro (Estonia) and amounting 
up to 215,000 euro (Hungary). With the exception of Belgium and Hungary, private benefits exceed 
public benefits in all countries.  
Comparing public and private benefits could provide a first indication about the relative 
contributions to the financing of higher education by the public and the student. The observations 
deserve, however, two remarks. First, one should note that among other limitations the public 
benefits as displayed in the table only comprise the additional tax revenues from individuals with 
tertiary education relative to those with non-tertiary education as well as saved transfer payments. 
Indeed, tertiary education graduates are less likely to be unemployed or sick. So, the positive effects 
of a more educated population for, e.g., economic growth, would have to be added to the public 
return.17 Second, we implicitly assume here the absence of any market failure. Governmental 
interventions, however, are called for independently of benefit considerations when there are 
market imperfections, e.g., related to borrowing constraints (see the next section as well as Barr, 
2014).   
In a closed economy, we would expect the fee-tax ratio to roughly reflect the ratio of total 
benefits as they accrue to the individual and to the public, respectively.  The question is then 
whether these conclusions have to be adjusted in an open economy, by which is meant, in our 
context, mobility of students and / or of graduates. 
 
                                                          
17
 Many other positive (causal) effects of education have been established, e.g., a reduction of crime (Lochner, 
Moretti, 2004) and an improvement of the health status (Webbink, Martin, Visscher, 2010). 
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Table 3 – Private and public benefits in 2008 (or latest available year) in net-
present value in equivalent USD converted using PPPs for GDP (mean of men 
and women) 
Country 
Private 
Benefits 
Public  
Benefits 
Private 
Index* 
Public 
Index* 
(Private 
– Public)  
/ Total 
Private 
/ Total 
Australia 166171 93958 87.0 83.5 27.8 % 63.9 % 
Austria 236476 159110 123.8 141.4 19.6 % 59.8 % 
Belgium 140903 177439 73.8 157.7 -11.5 % 44.3 % 
Canada 183575 86318 96.1 76.7 36.0 % 68.0 % 
Czech Republic 222826 107484 116.7 95.5 34.9 % 67.5 % 
Denmark 106617 89239 55.8 79.3 8.9 % 54.4 % 
Estonia 90610 26723 47.5 23.8 54.5 % 77.2 % 
Finland 173811 113999 91.0 101.3 20.8 % 60.4 % 
France 196484 101687 102.9 90.4 31.8 % 65.9 % 
Germany 184918 177091 96.8 157.4 2.2 % 51.1 % 
Hungary 174960 215674 91.6 191.7 -10.4 % 44.8 % 
Ireland 263123 162856 137.8 144.7 23.5 % 61.8 % 
Israel 168558 88638 88.3 78.8 31.1 % 65.5 % 
Italy 173002 148338 90.6 131.8 7.7 % 53.8 % 
Japan 219138 75263 114.8 66.9 48.9 % 74.4 % 
Korea 239529 47196 125.4 41.9 67.1 % 83.5 % 
Netherlands 226635 177804 118.7 158.0 12.1 % 56.0 % 
New Zealand 99297 50303 52.0 44.7 32.8 % 66.4 % 
Norway 149158 92805 78.1 82.5 23.3 % 61.6 % 
Poland 210093 106521 110.0 94.7 32.7 % 66.4 % 
Portugal 320627 117196 167.9 104.2 46.5 % 73.2 % 
Slovak Republic 187571 70037 98.2 62.2 45.6 % 72.8 % 
Slovenia 222633 165223 116.6 146.8 14.8 % 57.4 % 
Spain 167788 72709 87.9 64.6 39.5 % 69.8 % 
Sweden 114866 69956 60.2 62.2 24.3 % 62.2 % 
Turkey 82176 38000 43.0 33.8 36.8 % 68.4 % 
United Kingdom 260237 115103 136.3 102.3 38.7 % 69.3 % 
United States 365591 204132 191.4 181.4 28.3 % 64.2 % 
Average 190978 112529 100.0 100.0 27.4 % 63.7 % 
Source: OECD (2012, Tables A9.3 and A9.4). *The private (public) index relates 
the private (public) benefits compared to their respective average over 
countries. Private and public benefits refer to the difference between people 
who attained a tertiary education compared with those who attained an upper 
secondary or post‑secondary non-tertiary education. Private benefits include 
differences (positive or negative) in net earnings, transfers and grants; public 
benefits comprise differences in income tax and social contribution payments, 
transfers and grants. 
 
Without going into the analytical details, it is obvious that a financial regime which relies very much 
on taxes is not sustainable in the presence of significant mobility of graduates, i.e., high-skilled and 
high-wage tax-payers (Wildasin, 2014). With tax-financing, students receive their education free of 
charge at the time of studying as it is financed by tax revenues from those working at that time. 
Implicit in this is, however, the understanding that in the next period those former-students-and-
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now-workers finance the next student generation with their tax-payments. But this requires that 
those graduates – or for that matter, other graduates – be present in sufficient numbers.   
Taking all this into consideration, it is interesting to see to what extent the financing-mix of higher 
education reflects these observations. What can be said is that the systems differ in a significant way 
across countries as to the relative importance of public and private financing – see Table 4.  
 
Table 4 – Relative proportions of public and private expenditure for higher education 
Country 
Public 
Sources 
Private 
Sources Country 
Public 
Sources 
Private 
Sources 
Australia 45 55 Japan 35 65 
Austria 88 12 Korea 26 74 
Belgium 90 10 Mexico 69 31 
Canada 63 37 Netherlands 72 28 
Chile 23 77 New Zealand 68 32 
Czech Republic 80 20 Norway 96 4 
Denmark 95 5 Poland 70 30 
Estonia 80 20 Portugal 71 29 
Finland 96 4 Slovak Republic 70 30 
France 83 17 Slovenia 85 15 
Germany 84 16 Spain 79 21 
Iceland 92 8 Sweden 90 10 
Ireland 84 16 United Kingdom 30 70 
Israel 58 42 United States 38 62 
Italy 69 31    
Source: OECD (2012, Table B3.2b). Private sources refer mostly to tuition fees paid 
by private households; public sources are subsidies. Data are after transfers from 
public sources, i.e., subsidies attributable to payments to educational institutions 
received from public sources are included as private sources. 
 
At one end of the spectrum, we find the Nordic countries with a public share of close to 90% and 
above. In Germany, the share is 84% and in France 83%. At the other end, there are the UK, Korea 
and Chile each with a public share of less than 30% followed by Japan with 35% and the US with 38%. 
Comparing public expenditure for higher education as a share of total expenditure between 2000 
and 2009, a trend towards more private contributions can be identified (OECD, 2012, Table B3.3). 
This holds, in particular, for the UK where the public share in 2009 is less than half of what it was in 
2000. Exceptions are the US, Ireland and Spain where the private share decreased by more than 5 
percentage points.18 
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 Of course, nothing is said here about the relevance of special schemes, scholarships, etc. deemed to alleviate 
the burden and guarantee equality of chances independent from individual financial resources. 
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So, the financing schemes differ across countries, but do they also differ in a systematic way? We 
have discussed above that we would expect a positive association between the tax-fee mix and the 
ratio of public and private benefits on the one hand and a negative association between the tax-fee 
mix and graduate mobility on the other hand. Of course, there are many additional relevant factors 
which we do not take into account here. The correlations below are, therefore, mainly intended to 
highlight some basic relations which can be observed in a cross-country perspective. 
 
Figure 1 – Relation of public benefits to public expenditure  
(as shares of respective totals) 
 
 
Source: OECD (2012, Tables B3.2b, A9.3 and A9.4). Note for the regression 
results: constant 0.197 (t-value 3.357), slope coefficient 0.233 (t-value 
3.122) 
 
Considering first the relation of public benefits from and public expenditure for higher 
education (both as shares of the respective totals), we find a positive and highly significant 
association (Figure 1). So, a larger share of public benefits goes hand in hand with a larger 
share of public expenditure. Despite this, the shares are only (roughly) balanced for Korea 
where the public benefit share amounts to 16% and the public expenditure share to 22%, 
Japan (26% and 32%), the UK (31% and 35%) and the US (36% and 37%). Larger shares of 
public expenditure do not translate, however, into proportionally larger shares of public 
benefits and vice versa.
19
 In Germany, e.g., the public benefit share is 49% and the public 
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 Remember that public benefits do not include (positive) externalities and are, therefore, underestimated. 
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expenditure share almost twice as large with 85% and in France, the difference is even greater 
with a public benefit share of 34% and a public expenditure share of 81%. 
Turning to the relation between student mobility and the share of public expenditure, we find 
a negative association which is, however, not significant (Figure 2). So, a country with a 
larger share of international students does not have a regime which relies more heavily on 
private contributions via tuition fees. This is in contrast to what one would expect: as outlined 
above there is a positive relationship between student mobility and the migration decision 
after graduation. So, more mobile students and thus more mobile graduate tax-payers might 
put some pressure on the public budget for higher education. One would then expect the 
government or the voters, respectively, to react by increasing the private contributions. At 
least this would be the conclusion when one pursues a causal interpretation from student 
mobility to the decisions about the financing regime.  
A more direct way would be to relate graduate mobility to the public share of total 
expenditure for higher education. As data about graduate mobility are not available, we make 
use of data about the net brain gain (see Docquier and Marfouk, 2005). Figure 6.3 confirms 
our previous insights: there is a negative, but insignificant relation. A negative brain gain, i.e., 
a net outflow of highly educated workers is not associated, on average, with a larger share of 
private expenditure on total expenditure for higher education. Countries with comparable net 
outflows of between 0.4% and 0.6% have very different financing regimes with only the UK 
relying much on private contributions (public share of 35%), while Italy, the Czech Republic 
and Austria have large public shares of, respectively, 70%, 79% and 85%. On the other hand, 
the importance of public expenditure in immigration countries is relatively modest. Australia 
with a net brain gain of 11.4% relies on private and public financing in a very balanced way 
(public share of 48%). The public contributions to the financing of higher education are 
slightly larger for Canada with 59% and a net inflow of highly educated migrants of 10.7% 
while the US with a net inflow of 5.4% have the smallest public expenditure share of these 
three immigration countries with 37%. 
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Figure 2 – Relation of student mobility to public expenditure  
(as share of total expenditure) 
 
Source: OECD (2012, Tables B3.2b and C4.1). Note that for the Czech 
Republic (8.0), France (11.6), Greece (4.2), Italy (3.5), Korea (1.8) and Turkey 
(0.7), the data refer to non-native students as defined on the basis of their 
country of citizenship (“foreign student”). Note for the regression results: 
constant 8.416 (t-value 2.166) and slope coefficient -2.687 (t-value -0.516) 
and – when foreign students are excluded – constant 11.624 (t-value 2.401) 
and slope coefficient -6.159 (t-value -0.984). 
 
Figure 3 – Relation of graduate mobility to public expenditure  
(as share of total expenditure) 
 
Source: OECD (2012, Tables B3.2b), Docquier and Marfouk (2005, Tables 
5.1). Note for the regression results: constant 4.321 (t-value 1.747), slope 
coefficient -4.901 (t-value -1.474). 
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3.2 Theoretical considerations 
Looking at the data presented in the last section, several points stand out. Let us comment just on 
one, which is particularly illustrative for the following exposition: Some small countries, in particular 
Austria and Belgium, face a large number of students from their large neighbors, i.e., Germany and 
France, respectively, where the majority of these students returns after their graduation. At the 
same time, higher education in Austria and Belgium is primarily tax-financed. So these students, who 
come for their degree and leave afterwards, do not contribute in any significant way to the financing 
of higher education.  
Taking these observations as a starting point, we want to look more closely at the question of how 
higher education should be financed and how the financing regime is chosen by the government. For 
the sake of the argument, we assume here that the quality level of education is given.20 The choice of 
the financing regime is the policy variable, i.e., the mix between private financing via tuition fees and 
public financing via taxes.  
We start with a closed economy setting to derive the optimal mix which can then serve as a 
benchmark when considering an open economy.  
We consider a two-period general-equilibrium model with two ex-ante identical countries.21 
Individuals differ in their innate abilities, which are not observable. At the first stage, governments 
choose the educational policy. At the second stage, individuals make their education decision and – if 
the economy is open – their migration decision given the education policy as implemented by the 
government. Unskilled individuals are assumed to be immobile throughout. 
So, in the first period, individuals decide whether or not – and where, if borders are open – to 
acquire higher education, which will affect labor supply in the second period. For this, they compare 
the lifetime income with higher education to the lifetime income when uneducated. If individuals 
choose not to study, they work and receive the wage income of an unskilled worker in both periods 
in their home country. If individuals decide to acquire higher education at home or abroad, they 
receive no wage income in the first period. In the second period, if they are mobile, they decide in 
                                                          
20
 Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000), Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008) and Kemnitz (2010) are examples of 
papers which focus on the quality level, while Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) and Poutvaara (2004, 2008) study 
the structure, i.e. the relative importance of internationally and domestically applicable contents of higher 
education. Other papers analyze the financing-side of educational policy in the presence of fiscal competition. 
In the general-equilibrium setting of Wildasin (2000), e.g., tax level and tax structure are the choice variables 
while the simultaneous competition in the tax rate and a further fiscal instrument is central in Andersson and 
Konrad (2003), Haupt and Janeba (2009) and Krieger and Lange (2010). 
21
 This part is based on Demange, Fenge, Uebelmesser (2014). 
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which country to work and earn the wage income of a skilled worker there.22 Fees are paid according 
to the financial regime in place in the country that provides education, while taxes are paid in the 
country where the graduates work. In a closed economy, both countries trivially are the same while 
this will no longer necessarily be the case in an open economy with mobile graduates. For simplicity, 
the population is assumed to be constant. We only concentrate on steady state situations.  
For production, labor supplied by individuals with and without higher education, i.e., skilled and 
unskilled labor, is needed. Production takes place according to a neoclassical production function 
with constant returns to scale where both types of labor enter as complements. So, importantly, we 
abstract for the time being from any externalities apart from these technology-related interpersonal 
links. We will comment later on this. Furthermore, we assume competitive labor markets. So, the 
optimal demand for labor is such that productivities of skilled and unskilled workers are equal to 
their respective wage rates, which are endogenously determined. 
Due to individual-specific ability levels, it will turn out that only some individuals of a generation with 
high enough abilities decide to study while the rest starts working as unskilled. This decision is 
obviously affected by the financing regime in place which changes the costs borne by the individuals 
and thus the attractivity of the education investment. In general, quite intuitively, the higher the 
share of education costs financed by taxes, the more attractive it is to study. This allows on the one 
hand escaping the tax duties during the first period when studying, and above all it implies a reduced 
total financial burden as part of the costs are co-financed by the unskilled via their tax payments. 
3.2.1 Closed economy 
In the absence of any market imperfections, in particular with a perfect credit market, and 
abstracting from any social or public benefits, it is straightforward that there is no justification for 
public intervention: higher education should be financed via tuition fees only. On the contrary, if 
there was partial or full tax financing, this would lead to too many individuals who would decide to 
study and who would possess too low an ability level at the margin.  
It is certainly more appropriate, however, to allow for some market imperfections. In the following, 
credit market imperfections are considered. There is a mark-up to the interest rate which reflects, 
e.g., the moral hazard problems (see von Weizsäcker and Wigger, 2001, and Jacobs and van der 
Ploeg, 2006) or the riskiness of the human capital investment. What would then be the optimal 
financial regime? If the distortions on the credit market are not too large, there is still a positive fee 
level (albeit smaller than the total costs of higher education), which induces the optimal number of 
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 This approach has been introduced by Borjas (1987) where the prospective migrant compares wage abroad 
with wage at home plus migration cost. 
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individuals with the optimal ability levels to study. Only if the distortions are very important is it 
possible that a pure tax-financing regime results. So, distortions on the credit market justify a 
(partial) intervention of the government via tax-financing. In this case, a pure fee-regime would lead 
to too few students.  
Of course, when, in addition, benefits of higher education arising for society are taken into account 
(see Table 6.3 above for the relation of private and public benefits), a larger optimal tax-share would 
result. Still, a financing policy where higher education is (almost) totally financed by taxes appears to 
be hard to justify. 
So, in a general equilibrium framework we establish that the optimal solution as to the number of 
students (and their ability) can be reached with the right financing-mix (if credit market 
imperfections are not too large) – even if ability cannot be observed by the government. 
3.2.2 Open borders  
With open borders, however, it is no longer clear that this policy can be implemented. As the next 
step, therefore, we study in which direction and to what extent the results (financing mix and 
number of students) deviate from the optimal levels when governments take migration into account. 
For this, we consider two symmetric countries. It turns out that it matters who is mobile or, 
respectively, who is relatively more mobile: graduates, i.e., tax-payers, or students. The question is 
how the policy of one country changes when taking the policy of the other country into account.  
Let us first look at the scenario where only graduates are mobile at no cost. In our framework, this 
leads to an equalization of net wages across countries. The place of study, which is the place of birth 
in this scenario, does not affect the earnings opportunities in the second period. So, if countries 
choose a different tax-fee mix to finance higher education (for a given quality level), this will lead to 
migration from the high-tax to the low-tax country until marginal productivities and thus gross wages 
have adjusted sufficiently such that net wages are equal again. As a consequence, countries have an 
incentive to lower taxes and to increase fees starting from the closed-economy optimal tax-fee mix. 
A too high fee level, however, discourages some individuals from studying. In this sense, open 
borders with mobile students lead to an under-provision of education.23 
If not only graduates but also students are mobile at no cost, the situation is different. A marginal 
deviation of the optimal tax-fee mix leads now to a non-marginal reaction of the student population. 
If a country contemplates increasing its fee level without changing the quality level of education, this 
reduces the attractiveness of this country as a place to study compared to the other country. It 
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 See in particular Justman and Thisse (2000). 
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follows that all individuals will study in the country with the lower fee if they decide to study. These 
changes are far from marginal. On the contrary, as a result of the large inflow of students, the 
destination country has to change its financing policy: the tax rate or the fee level has to be raised. In 
particular, when the tax rate is already rather high, the country has to increase fees up to the same 
level as in the country which first raised its fee level. So, this would result in the same financing policy 
with the same number of students in both countries. But one should note that the financing-mix 
would again be sub-optimal and so would be the number of students. If countries anticipate the 
respective reaction of the other country, they should abstain from increasing the level of fees in the 
first place. A symmetric situation would thus emerge with no migration. Taking this into account, the 
countries would optimize as if in a closed economy and the optimal finance mix of the closed 
economy could be sustained.  
The scenario with full and costless migration of students and graduates is, admittedly, not very 
realistic in the short-run – also in the light of the data provided in the previous section. Still, if one 
takes the Erasmus-Program or the Bologna Process, which are intended to foster stays abroad for 
students by facilitating the recognition of qualifications and periods of study (see Section 1.2 above), 
they can all be seen as promoting migration by reducing migration costs in the medium- to long-run.  
So, what can be said when we look at the more realistic scenario with positive migration cost for 
both students and graduates? Can we then again talk about marginal reactions? There will be no 
longer a full net-of-tax wage arbitrage. This implies that the decision of where to study also becomes 
(to some extent) a decision on where to work as there are cost advantages when one stays in the 
country of education after graduation. It then becomes harder to attract graduates by (marginally) 
lowering taxes. At the same time, students are more valuable as future tax-payers. So, the relative 
mobility of students and graduates matters (see Lange, 2009). If graduates are relatively more 
mobile, there is still a tendency towards underprovision of higher education, i.e., towards too high 
fees and too few students. If students’ mobility is, however, relatively high, it is even possible that an 
overprovision of higher education results. 
Finally, if we bring the different scenarios together, there seems to be a possible U-shaped 
relation between the migration costs of students and graduates and the intensity of the tax-fee 
competition: a closed economy without migration and an open economy with costless migration of 
both students and graduates both result in the optimal (closed-economy) financing regime and the 
optimal number of students. An open economy with limited migration, on the contrary, leads to 
incentives for the countries to underprovide higher education and to free-ride on the higher 
education provided by other countries – at least when the (return) migration of graduates dominates 
students’ migration.  
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This at least holds for the financing system considered so far where the costs of higher education are 
(possibly) shared between the students and the (host) country which provides higher education. The 
country of previous education, or alternatively the country of work – if not identical to the country of 
higher education, is left out of the picture.  
So, a two-step procedure is called for to arrive at the optimal financing regime with open borders. In 
a first step, the private and social benefits and the corresponding share of costs borne via fees and 
taxes have to be determined. Then, in a second step, the specific implementation of the regime has 
to be considered. This involves the private part and the question of whether tuition fees should be 
levied at the time of studying or after graduation (as graduate taxes or income-contingent loans). The 
contributions by Barr (2014) and Del Rey and Racionero (2014) explicitly analyze this. This also 
concerns the public cost share and how it has to be allocated between the country of education and 
the country where indeed the social benefits arise. In fact, with migration, the financing would have 
to be split up among four parties: the graduates, according to their private returns, the country of 
higher education, that of previous education (possibly identical to that of birth), and the working-
country (or countries), according to the respective social returns which those countries benefit from. 
This will be analyzed in detail in Section 4.  
3.2.3. Asymmetric countries 
Before moving on, we want to briefly comment on two of our assumptions: symmetric countries and 
the given (and identical) quality level of higher education. Within this framework, we have 
considered the options a country B has if it faces a policy change by another country A. At least with 
rather low mobility costs, we have argued that it is plausible to expect that country B matches this 
policy. But what happens when country B is not able to adjust its policy accordingly - or more 
precisely, when country B cannot introduce fees even if it faces positive tuition fees in country A?24 
If A increases the fee level and B cannot match this because it continues to face constraints which 
restrict the financing instruments to pure tax-financing, B might contemplate changing the quality 
level of education. A migration equilibrium in the presence of different taxes and fees in the two 
countries can only exist, however, if the quality levels of education differ such that the quality is 
higher in country A (with high fees) than in country B (with low fees). Otherwise, why should 
students go, e.g., to the UK or the US despite the higher fees charged there by some (prestigious) 
universities? Country A, i.e., the UK or the US, then specializes in attracting high-ability students 
while country B focuses on the low-ability ones and an asymmetric equilibrium (possibly) results. 
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 See e.g. Austria where fees were ruled out in September 2008. 
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Otherwise, all students would go to country B where the given educational quality is provided most 
cheaply (for zero fees).25 
Whether this constitutes an equilibrium when general equilibrium effects are taken into account 
depends on the specific functional forms. The relative importance of student and graduate mobility 
will be essential for the financial regime as well as the quality level of education and the cost 
function.26 
 
4. How should the costs of higher education be shared between the affected countries? 
We may now discuss the current system of financing higher education of cross border students in the 
EU and investigate alternative avenues which fit aspects of the challenges mentioned above. 
Comparisons with alternative devices, like the Bhagwati tax and the instrument of Contingent Loans 
will be conducted including a discussion of US policies.27 As basic setting for this section we use the 
old and new paradigms already mentioned and depicted in Section 1. 
4.1. The old paradigm 
In that setting the resident is born in one country, she studies in that country and after graduation 
she works in that country, too. Therefore the countries of origin, studies and work are identical. That 
corresponds to a closed economy but also to an open one; let us call it a union, provided that 
education policy, especially tertiary education, is centrally designed.  
The objective of the country is to maximize a Social Welfare Function based on its own benefits and 
costs. Benefits are basically the contribution of graduates to GDP. However those benefits might be 
split in two sets: one consists of private benefits like a better pay, better working conditions, smaller 
risk of unemployment, and better health; the other conveys social benefits which include spillover 
effects on the quality of the working force in the area, taxes paid on higher wages, possibly levied in 
a progressive way, larger contributions to social security, and simultaneously fewer costs in terms of 
social benefits like unemployment benefits and health-related expenditure.  
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 Another, related example of an intentional differentiation strategy within countries concerns the Russell 
Group in the UK. This association of 20 major research-intensive universities strives at maintaining the highest 
standards of research, education and knowledge transfer. By doing so, the universities which belong to this 
group clearly want to differentiate themselves with respect to other British and possibly European and North-
American universities in terms of quality and in terms of tuition fees. Fees are limited to formerly £3,000 and 
now £9,000 per year for full-time British and EU undergraduates, whereas there is no limit for fees for students 
coming from outside the European Union (Murphy, 2014). 
26
 See Demange and Fenge (2009) for a model which deals with this question - albeit in a simplified version of 
the model presented here. 
27
 The setting below is based on a simple model initially introduced in Gérard (2007). 
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Costs basically include the cost of providing students with higher education, and the opportunity cost 
of no contribution to GDP during the period of studies. Those costs may also be split into private and 
social costs.  
Taking into account all these benefits and costs the country or the union decides on an optimal 
amount of tertiary education. A formal value for that amount is provided by equation (3) below. 
However, even though the centralized outcome makes sense in a country, it does not at the level of a 
union like the EU where provision and financing of higher education is a competence that countries 
or subdivisions of countries are not ready to transfer to the center. Therefore, at that level, one may 
seek for a decentralized design which reproduces the centralized outcome. 
4.2. The new paradigm 
Let us now introduce the distinction between the country of origin, that which hosts the students 
and the country of work or the destination country, respectively – Table 5. In that framework, we 
investigate a series of education policy devices in order to assess their respective capacity of 
approximating the centralized one, i.e.to assess their efficiency in terms of internalization of cross 
border spillover effects. 
 
Table 5 – Benefit and cost for the origin, host and destination countries 
Country j (origin) i (host of higher 
education) 
k (third destination for 
working purposes) 
Host Country Pr. Benefit = returning 
graduates 
Cost = Opportunity 
Benefit = remaining 
graduates 
Cost = Studies 
Benefit = attracted 
graduates 
No cost 
Origin Country Pr. Benefit = returning 
graduates 
All costs 
Benefit = remaining 
graduates 
No cost 
Benefit = attracted 
graduates 
No cost 
Origin Country + 
Bhagwati tax (BT)  
or Contingent loan 
Benefit = returning 
graduates 
Cost = All - BT 
Benefit = remaining 
graduates 
Cost = BT on remaining 
Benefit = attracted 
graduates 
Cost = BT on attracted 
 
Benefits of a country primarily consist of the contribution to domestic GDP of graduates who, after 
their graduation, decide to settle there. In addition, benefits also consist of the net local 
expenditures by foreign students during their stay in that (host) country and possibly of the money 
they bring from home to finance their tuition fees. Finally, the last component of the benefits is not 
the least: it relates to the opportunity cost.  Indeed, during their period of tertiary education, 
students do not belong to the workforce of their origin country and they do not contribute to the 
GDP of that country; that creates an opportunity cost. When a country keeps or attracts a foreign 
student after her graduation, it not only gets the contribution of that person to GDP, but also avoids 
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the burden of the opportunity cost, which is actually supported by her (origin) country of previous 
education; therefore the (host or destination) country enjoys an externality. 
Costs basically include the cost of providing students with higher education, and possibly the 
compensations to be paid to the country of origin of the graduates.   
All in all the fact that the Social Welfare Function only considers students who, when they graduate, 
will contribute to local GDP, and does not internalize corresponding opportunity cost, makes the 
number of cross border students inefficient and involves free riding by at least one country. 
In the following, we first consider a system ruled by the Host Country Principle, which is mostly 
applied in the European Union, with the noticeable exception of England. We will complete the 
section with a brief comparison between EU and Anglo-Saxon practices. Then we will turn to 
alternative designs and discuss their properties, especially from a cross-border efficiency point of 
view. 
4.2.1. The current Host Country Principle 
Currently, in most EU member states except England, higher education for native and other EU-
students is mainly publicly funded by the local government of the host or higher education country, 
and thus by the taxpayers of that country, that we have named i above (see Table 6.5). Moreover the 
tuition fees v are either zero or equal to a very moderate amount compared to those charged in 
England or the US, or in the EU to non-EU residents – see the contribution of Murphy (2014).  These 
features characterize what is named here the Host Country Principle. Formally – see Gerard (2007) – 
we may depict the social welfare and objective function of host country i, as 
  i i i ijji ji ji ji ji ji ji ji ji jiW f n v n q n cn n          (1) 
where we assume for the sake of simplicity that people working in i have received their pre-tertiary 
education in j  but their tertiary education in i. We abstract from any third country k here. 
That equation deserves some comments. First,  iji jif n   is the social value of the discounted flow 
of future contributions to GDP in i by the fraction 
i
ji  of the jin  students, whose country of origin is 
j and whose country of tertiary education is i, and who decide to stay in i after graduation;   is a 
parameter which reflects the social value of that contribution. 
Two questions, at least, then arise. First, what is the size of ? Van Bouwel and Veugelers (2014) 
suggest a figure around 70% for young Europeans who have obtained their PhD in the US. A similar 
figure of about 70% is set forth for OECD countries by Felbermayr and Reczkowski (2014). However, 
i
ji
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they say that the average effect is entirely driven by Anglo-Saxon countries. For the EU they arrive at 
a retention rate of about one third, but with a very high dispersion: retention or stay rate is larger 
than 30% in Ireland and the UK but around 3 to 5% in continental European countries like Austria, 
Belgium, France or Germany. 
This difference is important. In our opinion, it reflects the fact that, in the EU, there are clearly two 
different types of student mobility, already illustrated in Section 2 – see Table 1. On the one hand, 
there is the migration of the most talented students who primarily go to Anglo-Saxon countries 
where they are likely to stay. On the other hand, there is that of students who fail at entrance 
examination level in their country and attempt to get an equivalent degree abroad, almost all of 
whom return home after graduation. See the case of French or German students enrolling in 
neighboring countries. 
The second question is about the value of  , in particular, whether the social value – by which is 
meant the combination of the private and public values or benefits – of the contribution to local GDP 
by foreign graduates remaining in their education country exceeds the private value or benefit of 
their degree? That question is to some extent highlighted in Gagliardi (2014). 
The second comment related to equation (1) is on jiq where   captures a multiplier effect and jiq
reflects the net amount of expenditures by foreign students. The size of those expenditures is not 
discussed here but it is extensively documented in the literature as recalled by Gérard (2012).  
Finally, we do not comment on the cost of studies c and the tuition fee jiv , except that we suppose 
0jic v  ; and we leave transfers aside for the time being. In that context, the number of 
foreign students that the higher education country i will want to host will be, assuming a log 
specification for the  jif n  function, 
 
i
jiH
ji
ji ji
n
c v q
 


 
 (2) 
where the superscript H indicates that the Host Country Principle applies.28 That number increases 
with the probability of staying in the country after graduation, with the social value of foreign 
graduates’ contribution to domestic GDP, with the height of the tuition fee they pay and with their 
net effect on local expenditures; and it decreases with the cost of studies, supported by the host 
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 The number of students derived from this equation might be considered as an optimal quota of foreign 
students such as the one determined by Austria and Belgium in some paramedical programs; see European 
Court of Justice (2010). 
ij
ji
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country. That number however is not efficient since, as explained above, country i does not include 
externalities in its calculation. If one takes those spillover effects into account, the expression above 
becomes 
 
E
jin
c w



 (3) 
It is different from the previous one in three respects. First, the effect on the total GDP of the various 
countries affected is counted. Second, the opportunity cost of higher education, w , is embodied; that 
latter cost is supported by country j, the country of origin of the students. And finally transfers 
between countries cancel out – though that point might be debated. Comparing (2) and (3), the 
application of the Host Country Principle leads to an inefficient outcome: too few foreign students 
are admitted if the probability to stay abroad after graduation is low,   
 1
ji jii
ji
c v q
c w


 
 

 (4) 
In contrast too many foreign students are admitted if that probability is high.  
We know that in most EU countries today the staying rate of foreign students,
i
ji , is low – if one 
uses the figures suggested by Felbermayr and Reczkowski (2014) – and tuition fees, jiv , are close to 
zero. If we further assume that the net effect jiq  vanishes, then it is very likely that we observe too 
few mobile foreign students. In contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon world where 
i
ji  is high and jiv  close to 
c, there will be too many foreign students attending classes in universities. That large supply of seats 
for foreigners in Anglo-Saxon aula, especially in Canada, New-Zealand, the US and Australia, means 
that those countries may attract, or want to attract, foreign students without supporting the 
opportunity costs of studies – see above for the explanation of that cost.  
To sum up, under the assumptions above, we find 
 
0 , , , 0 , EU Case
, , 0 , Anglo-Saxon Case
i
jiH E i
ji ji ji
ji ji
i
jiH E
ji ji
ji ji
n n v q
c v q
n n v c q
c v q
 


 

   
 
    
 
 (5) 
The Anglo-Saxon view where  actually characterizes the first alternative examined below. jiv c
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4.2.2. The Origin Country Principle 
A first alternative to the Host Country Principle is the Origin Country Principle. According to that 
mechanism, the country of origin of a student, say her country of secondary education, is responsible 
for her higher education irrespective of whether the latter takes place at home or abroad. In both 
cases, it is up to the origin country to pay; it does not matter whether it is through a direct transfer 
from country to country or through a fellowship – a voucher – given to the student herself. 
Accordingly, that jurisdiction will decide on the number of students it sends abroad. Then the 
relevant Social Welfare Function is that of country j and may be written, under similar simplifying 
assumptions as before, as 
  j j i ijji ji ji ji ji ji ji ji jiW f n q n cn wn n          (6) 
where, in the following, the  -terms will again be set to zero. Notice that, here, the term jicn
illustrates that the origin country j pays to the higher education country i the true cost of studies, i.e. 
jiv c . Moreover jiwn  refers to the opportunity cost mentioned earlier, that students, during 
their tertiary education period, do not contribute to the GDP, here in their country of origin, j.  
Then the equilibrium number of students sent abroad amounts to 
 
 1 ij jijiO
ji
ji ji
n
q c w q c w
  
 

 
   
 (7) 
where the superscript O indicates that the Origin Country Principle applies. That number is again 
inefficient since spillover effects are not taken into account, now by the government of country j.  
Compared to the Host Country Principle, the number of foreign students will be larger, however, 
under the Origin Country Principle if 
 jii j
ji ji
c v
c w
 



 (8) 
Where we assume as before that 0jiq  . It turns out that in the typical EU case where 
i
ji  and jiv  
are small (see above), shifting from the Host to the Origin Country Principle might be a Pareto 
improvement, since it increases the number of cross border students, while it may not be the case 
for Anglo-Saxon countries. Indeed, under the assumptions of this simple model, we find that 
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 (9) 
Let us now investigate how to implement the Origin Country Principle and have a look at two 
actual examples where such a device is applied: Switzerland and the Nordic countries. 
The system described above can be implemented through the provision of vouchers by the 
government of a given country to potential students who are residents of that country. Those 
vouchers may be used for, say, one year of studies in a particular field in a university located at home 
or abroad, provided it is recognized as an institution of high quality by the issuer of the voucher. 
Those vouchers should either cover the actual cost of studies or a standardized one. It is up to the 
issuer of the voucher to decide whether the vouchers are distributed upon request or are allocated 
through a competition, and whether they are made available for free or subject to a present or 
future (re)payment.  
In the case of competition, and provided that other countries commit to not admitting students 
without a voucher, that device expands the geographical area of sovereignty to the set of those 
countries, e.g., the Bologna area or the European Union. As an example, let’s imagine that Germany 
limits the number of students admitted to the first year of medicine in German universities in order 
to optimize the supply of medical services in the future; those young Germans who go to Austria and 
enroll in the schools of medicine there try to bypass the German numerus clausus – at least when 
they plan to go back to Germany after they have obtained their MD degree (according to the EU law 
they will be permitted to practice medicine, at least in hospitals). If we move to the Origin Country 
Principle, only those young Germans with a voucher issued by the German authorities will be 
admitted to Austrian schools of medicine. Thus the decision to admit those students for studies in 
medicine, even outside Germany, is in the hand of the German authorities who are then in a position 
to expand the application of their numerus clausus rules and thus their area of sovereignty. And 
similarly, Austria has the opportunity to sell the quality of its medicine schools while being in 
accordance with German public health policy. 
Though the vouchers depicted above channel the transfer implied by the Origin Country Principle 
through students, that transfer may alternatively be directly operated by governments. This is 
already the case in Switzerland and in the Nordic Countries. In Switzerland, cantons that do not have 
universities pay for the studies of their residents in universities located in other cantons. Similarly, 
among Nordic countries, if, say, a Norwegian student enrolls in a university in Denmark, Norway will 
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partially compensate Denmark. To illustrate that system, based on a four country agreement, notice 
that “the previous agreement was signed in 1996, and the new agreement will be effective from 1 
January 2013 for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (…) The new agreement means that the 
yearly compensation per student for Denmark will be DKK 22,000 (US$ 3,800) in 2013 – the same as 
it was in 2012 – rising to DKK 30,000 (US$ 5,200) in 2014. The compensation will be regulated 
according to the consumption index calculated each year by Statistics Denmark.  
Under European Union (EU) regulations, Denmark is obliged to treat citizens of the EU and the 
European Economic Area the same as Danish citizens, which means that European students are 
entitled to free higher education in Denmark. The compensation agreement has been concluded 
despite this, with the cost to be carried by governments rather than by individual students”.29 It 
seems from that quotation that direct transfers between governments are a way to bypass EU 
legislation. In the same line, Switzerland plans to demand compensatory transfers for German 
students who study in Switzerland. Switzerland is also willing to pay something to Germany for Swiss 
students in Germany. But as the numbers are unbalanced (many more Germans study in Switzerland 
than vice versa), Germany would transfer much more money.30 
4.2.3. Bhagwati Tax and Contingent Loans 
In an increasingly integrated world, graduates are most likely to work in a country different from 
both their country of origin and their country of higher education. That third country, denoted by k 
and referred to as the destination country, benefits from a high skilled worker without supporting 
the cost of her education – in country I – and the corresponding opportunity cost – in country j. 
Country k, in other words, free rides on its two partners, which constitutes an important source of 
inefficiency. Can we find a remedy for that inefficiency? 
A new application of the Baghwati Tax as proposed by Bhagwati (1976) and again in Wilson (2008) is 
one such remedy. In this application, those who have studied at the expenses of one country and 
currently work in another country have to compensate the former for the cost of their tertiary 
education. In practice that may take the form of a transfer by the government of the latter country to 
the government of the former within an agreement similar to the Nordic one – see above. If the Host 
Country Principle applies for the financing of the studies the transfer is due to that country; but then 
the opportunity cost supported by the country of origin is not offset. Under the Origin Country 
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 See University World News, 03 November 2012, 
 http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20121031163939447#.UJOYFr7pNiM.email. 
30
 See Neue Züricher Zeitung, 21 October 2012. 
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Principle the transfer is due to the origin country and may include the compensation of the 
opportunity cost. 
That latter solution combining the Bhagwati Tax with the Origin Country Principle might be superior 
since then a transfer from the third destination country may offset both the opportunity cost and the 
cost of studies. The objective of the origin country is then to maximize the Social Welfare Function 
(6) where the transfer  funded by the Bhagwati Tax is no longer zero. Assuming that after 
completion of their studies in country i, graduates whose origin country is j distribute between the 
three countries involved, the number of students sent abroad by their country of origin amounts to,  
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If the discounted flow of tax liabilities matches the costs supported by the origin country, the number 
of students becomes, 
 
 /
BT
ji j
ji ji
n
q c w

 

 
 (11) 
which only differs from the efficient one – see equation (3) above – by the /
j
ji jiq  term in the 
denominator with jiq as defined above (and assumed to vanish in the computation of mobile 
students suggested in equations (5) and (9)).  
Another instrument to remedy the inefficiency set forth above is to turn vouchers into contingent 
loans, a well-known mechanism investigated a.o. by Barr (2014) and Del Rey and Racionero (2014). If 
payments associated to the contingent loans are deductible against the personal income tax 
liabilities – imagine a tax credit – in the country of residence, this mechanism is similar to the 
Bhagwati Tax, except possibly for its timing. Alternatively, when the graduate stays abroad, the 
charge of the loan might be isolated by the local tax administration and transferred to the country of 
origin deemed to have made the loan, creating a compensation of the origin country by the 
destination one. In both cases, equation (11) holds. 
4.2.4. Foreign students in US postgraduate education: a mix of Origin and Host Country Principles 
Especially interesting is the case of foreign students in US universities. During their first – and 
sometimes second – year of graduate studies the Origin Country Principle usually applies. They are 
pre-selected by, and in, their country of origin, and sent to the US with a fellowship from their origin 
country intended to cover the cost of the studies and the cost of living during those years, a 
precondition to get a student visa. US universities then make their choice among the pre-selected 
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applicants. Usually again, if they succeed at the end of that period and decide to go ahead with a US 
graduate program, they receive support from the US university, and thus the Host Country Principle 
applies.  
After graduation they are likely to remain in the US, as pointed out by Van Bouwel and Veugelers 
(2014) where a retention rate of around 70 % for PhD holders is set forth.  
4.2.5. …and a way to unveil the missing characters 
One may easily understand the behavior of US universities or of the US in general. Given the high 
probability that the best students remain in the country after their graduation, a probability that 
presumably increases with the length of the stay in the US, the Host Country Principle is more likely 
to be more efficient than the Origin Country Principle. Arguing that the probability goes up with the 
length of the stay is a way to explicitly re-introduce a first missing character, the cost of migration, 
and thus to relate this discussion with the seminal approach suggested by Borjas (1987).  
Understanding the behavior of the countries which pay for their best students going to the US, thus 
applying the Origin Country Principle, is more demanding. A first argument to justify such a policy is 
that more money is available for studies in the US than for studies in other countries, partly because 
that money comes from budgets and foundations co-funded by the US and the origin country, such 
as the Fulbright and Fulbright-Schuman grants. 
Leaving aside that argument one may question why the money is not preferably used to send 
students to other countries, whose retention rate is lower or who require smaller investment. 
Most importantly that issue allows us to introduce the second missing character in the reasoning: 
quality, or at least, perceived quality. By that term we mean academic and scientific quality as 
testified by reviews and rankings, but also quality in terms of networking opportunities and fluency in 
the lingua franca, i.e., English.31 The parameter   which brings into the model the gain from studies 
abroad might incorporate quality and quality differences. Suppose you have the choice between 
sending a bright student to country a and sending her to country b. The probability of her return is 
1 a  if she goes to country a and  1 b  if she enrolls in country b, with 1 1a b    . Values of 
  are a and b , respectively, with a b   and costs are  ac  and bc with a bc c . According to 
the model used so far, especially equation (6), the student will be sent to a rather than to b if, 
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 On networking and especially the Taiwan-Silicon Valley relation, see Hsu and Saxenian, (2001). On the 
premium granted to the knowledge of English see, e.g., Vaillancourt, Lemary and Vaillancourt (2007). 
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 (12) 
The last term on the right hand side of the inequality shows that the introduction of a Bhagwati tax 
or of a contingent loan of the kind described above increases the likelihood for the inequality to be 
fulfilled. More generally the inequality shows that the return on the investment measured by a  
should exceed a threshold which depends on a series of variables.  
Therefore one may conjecture that, even now, the qualitative and quantitative return on a US 
degree, despite the few students who come back, outweighs any alternative destinations for studies. 
This approach might be compared with that of Haupt, Krieger and Lange (2014). Those authors argue 
that “a higher permanent migration probability, i.e., a higher probability that international students 
continue to stay in their host country after graduation, incentivizes the host country to improve its 
education quality. A higher education quality in turn raises the human capital of all students, 
including returning students. As long as the permanent migration probability is not too large, this 
positive quality effect increases human capital and welfare in both the less developed country (LDC – 
the sending country) and the developed host country. Thus, a brain gain to the LDC occurs.” 
A third missing character is asymmetry between countries beyond the difference pointed out so far. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Features specific to the European Union exacerbate the issues raised by international mobility of 
students and graduates there. Among those features we have set forth the political desirability of 
students mobility viewed as a building block for Europe, the existence of powerful instruments like 
the Erasmus program and the Bologna process, low tuition fees in most EU member states, and the 
principles of non-discrimination and subsidiarity. In such an environment, mobility of students is 
especially a challenge for public provision and financing of tertiary education: indeed mobility 
increases with the level of education, mobility of students incentivizes mobility of graduates and, 
above all, mobility of students is unbalanced, creating different subsets of countries within the EU. 
Among them a distinction has to be made between countries which are net importers and net 
exporters of students. Within the former group one has, in addition, to distinguish between countries 
which finance the studies of their neighboring fellows with a limited retention rate of graduates, 
countries which have a limited retention rate but have the studies of the neighboring fellows 
financed partially or totally by their respective countries of origin, and finally countries where foreign 
students support the cost of their studies but are likely to stay after their graduation.  
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Those features raise the two questions that we have coped with in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. 
First, how should the costs of education be shared between the individual and the government? And 
second, how should the costs of higher education be shared between the affected countries? 
For the first question the relative shares of private and public or social returns play an important role 
as well as market imperfections such as credit constraints and externalities. While a financing scheme 
which only relies on tuition fees will not turn out to be optimal, this also holds for pure tax-financing 
of higher education. In an open economy, in addition, the conclusions depend on the relative 
intensity of student and graduate mobility as well as – and this already refers to the second question 
– on the absence or presence of intergovernmental transfer systems.  
The second question allows us to make a distinction between the old paradigm, when a resident of a 
country was born, studied and worked in the same country, and the more and more relevant new 
paradigm where the country of origin of a students is no longer the one where she will study, or the 
one where she will work after completion of her studies. In such a setting, decentralized education 
policy leads to inefficiently low or high public provision and financing of tertiary education, 
depending on the retention rate after graduation due to externalities. As a centralized device 
internalizing those externalities is not feasible, at least in a union like today’s EU, the question then is 
to find a decentralized device which comes closest to the outcome of the efficient centralized one. 
With that objective in mind, we have investigated the properties of some avenues, like substituting 
the host country principle with the origin country one, through vouchers or intergovernmental 
transfers, with possible compensation of the origin country by the destination country; expanding 
the use of contingent loans; or introducing a Bhagwati tax. All that paves the way for further research 
and more focused work on these issues. 
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